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INTRODUCTION

The Chinese government has pegged their currency – the renminbi or yuan – against the
dollar since 1994, which prevents the yuan from fluctuating based on market forces.1 Unlike the
free floating U.S. dollar, China maintains a fixed exchange rate through governmental
intervention.2 Many U.S. labor and manufacturing organizations believe China’s currency policy
violates various provisions of the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) and General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”).3 They claim that the exportation of U.S. jobs to China and
increased demand for Chinese imports are a result of China’s fixed currency regime.4 The U.S.

1

See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve Statistical Release:
Foreign Exchange Rates, 1990-99 (indicating that China revalued its currency in relation to the
dollar from 5.8 to 8.7 yuan on Jan. 3, 1994), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h10/hist/dat96_ch.txt (last updated Nov. 8, 2004).
2

See JOHN J. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS §
22.1 (4th ed. 2002)(distinguishing between floating exchange rates, which increase or decrease
in value based on supply and demand; and fixed exchange rates, which remain pegged through
government bank purchase of incoming currency or constraints on outflows of domestic
currency).
3

See China Currency Coalition, The Section 301 Petition, at 49 (Sept. 9, 2004)[hereinafter
Petition](claiming that China’s fixed-peg currency regime violates Article VI (Anti-Dumping
and Countervailing Measures), Article XVI (Subsidies) of GATT, and the Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement) of the WTO Agreement), available at
http://www.chinacurrencycoalition.org/petition.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2004).
4

See id. at 6 (asserting that the China’s maintenance of an undervalued currency has substantially
increased demand for inexpensive Chinese exports and attracted U.S. businesses in search of
cheap labor, which has produced a severe bilateral trade deficit).
1

Government also opposes China’s currency policy, but believes a diplomatic approach, rather
than a formal complaint to the WTO, is the appropriate governmental response.5
China is an enormous market.6 With a population of more than one billion people and its
gradual transition to a market economy, China has experienced increased trade and foreign direct
investment (“FDI”).7 The Chinese economy is growing rapidly and is currently the United
States’ third largest trading partner.8 In 2001, China became a member of the WTO and the
United States was allowed greater access to China’s vast market.9 Exports from the United States
to China have increased substantially since 2001, but are greatly outweighed by imports from
China.10 Consequently, a growing trade deficit exists between the United States and China.11

5

See Paul Bluestein, China at G-7 Meeting for First Time: U.S. Sticks With Patient Approach On
Currency Issues, THE WASH. POST, October 2, 2004, at E1 (stating the approach of Treasury
Secretary John W. Snow and the Bush Administration of coaxing the Chinese to change their
currency policy rather than bullying them).
6

See Office of United States Trade Rep., Fact Sheets: America’s Trade with China (Apr. 21,
2004) (noting that between 2000 and 2003 U.S. exports to China grew by 76 percent and rising
incomes of China’s 1.3 billion consumers has made China the sixth largest market for U.S.
exports), at
http://www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/Fact_Sheets/2004/America's_Trade_with_China.html
(last visited Nov. 11, 2004).
7

See Export.gov, Office of China Economic Area: China Country Profile – Economy (May 24,
2004)(indicating that China’s population is approximately 1.3 billion people and economic
reforms that began in 1979 have lead to the largest amounts of foreign direct investment in the
world - totaling $53 billion in 2002), at http://www.mac.doc.gov/china/Economy.htm (last
visited Oct. 17, 2004).
8

See supra note 6 (revealing that China surpassed Japan in trade with the United States and
while global growth fell by 2 percent over the last three years, the Chinese economy expanded
by more than 8 percent).
9

See generally Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China, WT/L/432 (Nov.
23, 2001)(outlining the trade liberalizing concessions and policies that China is responsible for
implementing as a member of the WTO), at
http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_home.asp?language=1&_=1 (last visited Nov. 1, 2004).

2

Although China has made significant progress in opening its economy to foreign competition, it
has failed to implement several of its WTO obligations.12 In addition to their WTO
shortcomings, China continues to peg the yuan against the dollar, which many believe is an
undervalued rate of exchange.13 However, China recently indicated its desire to move towards a
more liberal currency regime, but was hesitant to set a date because of domestic economic
challenges.14 Most of the disagreement revolves around the proper methods for the U.S.
government to adopt in pressuring or forcing China to liberalize its currency policy.15
This comment will evaluate whether China’s fixed currency regime constitutes a
violation of the GATT or WTO concerning subsidies and dumping. The arguments charging

10

See U.S. Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Statistics: Trade with China (Nov. 10, 2004)(listing
total exports from the United States to China during 2003 at approximately $28 billion, while
imports from China to the United States totaled $152 billion), at http://www.census.gov/foreigntrade/balance/c5700.html#2003 (last modified Nov. 9, 2004).
11

See id. (revealing the trade deficit between the U.S. and China for 2003 was $124 billion, an
increase of $21 billion from 2002, and $41 billion from 2001).
12
See generally Office of the United States Trade Rep., 2003 Report to Congress on China’s
WTO Compliance (Dec. 11, 2003)(indicating that China failed to implement trade liberalizing
commitments concerning Agriculture, Intellectual Property Rights, Services, Valued-Added Tax
Policies, Transparency, Trading Rights, and Distribution Services), at
http://www.ustr.gov/World_Regions/North_Asia/China/Section_Index.html (last visited Nov. 1,
2004).
13

See Elizabeth Becker, IMF Asks China to Free Its Currency From Dollar, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
30, 2004, at C1 (explaining that the IMF, the U.S. Government, and various labor groups agree
that China’s maintenance of the yuan at 8.28 to each U.S. dollar is contributing to increased
Chinese exports and trade imbalances).
14

See Neil King Jr. & Charles Hutzler, China Tells U.S. Yuan Flexibility Is on the Horizon,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 29, 2004, at A2 (noting China’s intent to adopt a more flexible exchange rate
regime, but five percent inflation, inefficient state operated companies, and a banking sector
encumbered with bad loans might prevent monetary policychanges in the near term).
15

See Elizabeth Becker, Industry and Labor Step Up Fight Over China’s Currency, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 10, 2004, at C3 (reporting the U.S. Government’s disagreement and dismissal of the
Section 301 Petition submitted by various labor groups including the AFL-CIO, urging the U.S.
Government to take legal action against China in regard to their currency policy).
3

China with violating the WTO and GATT have been articulated by the “Section 301 Petition”
(“the Petition”).16 This comment will argue that a thorough examination of the relevant
provisions reveals that China is not violating the WTO or GATT by maintaining a fixed currency
regime.17 Since a formal complaint to the WTO would probably fail, the United States should
assist China in reforming its banking and financial services sectors while strongly urging
compliance with existing WTO obligations.18 Creating conditions of stability and security within
China’s banking and financial industries might obviate the Chinese Government’s reluctance to
adopt a more liberal currency policy.19
Part I of this comment provides a background on China’s monetary policy; an overview
of the Bretton Woods institutions; and relevant trade law concerning the dispute over China’s
currency policy.20 Part II evaluates whether China’s exchange rate policy constitutes a subsidy as

16

See supra note 3, at 50 (providing an analysis of how China violated Article VI and XVI of
GATT and the SCM Agreement).
17

See discussion infra Part II (arguing that China’s currency policy is not a prohibited subsidy).

18

See Sebastian Edwards, China Should Not Rush to Float its Currency, FINANCIAL TIMES, Aug.
3, 2003 (speculating that China’s increased compliance with its WTO obligations and reform of
its banking sector would relieve trade imbalances and promote monetary stability), available at
http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/crisis/2003/0803rush.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2004).
19

See Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Australia, China to keep rational exchange
rates, continue financial reforms: Premier (Feb. 11, 2004) (specifying that reform of state-run
banks, improvement of financial asset management companies, and restructuring of the
insurance sector are allissues that present obstacles to currency reform), at
http://www.chinaembassy.org.au/eng/zggk/jj/t64282.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2004).
20

See discussion infra Part I (providing background on China’s economy, an overview of the
Bretton Woods Conferences, the scope of the IMF and GATT, and explanations of the relevant
WTO and GATT provisions).
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defined by relevant provisions of the GATT and WTO.21 Part III provides suggestions on how to
influence China to adopt a more liberal currency regime or reduce the bilateral trade deficit.22
I. BACKGROUND
Historically, China has been plagued with failed efforts to modernize and reform its
economy.23 In 1979, after the death of Zedong Mao, one of the most prominent political figures
in Chinese history, veteran members of the Chinese Communist Party adopted a more liberal
economic policy that minimized central planning and encouraged privatization.24 During the
1980’s, China continued to pursue market oriented reforms, which resulted in significant
economic growth.25 Rapid economic expansion produced inflation and the Chinese government
reacted by adopting a strict monetary policy to reverse inflationary pressure.26 Part of their
monetary policy included pegging the yuan against the dollar in 1994, which helped reduce

21

See discussion infra Part II (evaluating whether China’s currency policy violates WTO and
GATT provisions on subsidies).
22
See discussion infra Part III (reasoning that China might be more amenable to adopting a
liberal exchange rate if the appropriate support structures were in place and full compliance with
existing WTO obligations and elimination of capital flows restrictions would improve bilateral
trade imbalances).
23

See U.S. Dept. of State, Background Note: China (Oct. 2004) (tracing the failed effort of
Zedong Mao to implement revolutionary economic policies starting in 1958, leading to years of
political friction and economic stagnation), at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/18902.htm (last
visited Nov. 10, 2004).
24

See id. (explaining the evolution of economic reforms adopted after the death of Mao in 1976,
which included an increased emphasis on improving the standard of living, cultivating the arts,
and allowance of political dissent).
25

See id. (indicating that the reforms of 1979 led to annual growth rates of 10% in agriculture
and industrial output, and doubled annual income in rural areas).
26

See Dai Gen-you, China’s Monetary Policy: Retrospect and Prospect (Nov. 3, 2001) (noting in
1995 the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China proclaimed that curbing inflation
was the primary concern and implemented tight monetary policies to accomplish their goal), at
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/APCITY/UNPAN002817.pdf (last
visited Oct. 22, 2004).
5

inflation and maintain economic growth.27 In addition, the tight monetary controls utilized by the
Chinese Government allowed China to avoidthe effects of the Asian monetary crisis that
occurred in the late 1990’s.28 Currently, China’s economy is still expanding and strict monetary
policies have continued to promote economic growth, despite inflationary pressure and large
amounts of bad debt.29
A. Bretton Woods System
After World War II a series of conferences resulted in the creation of the International
Monetary Fund (“IMF”), the World Bank, and GATT (1947).30 Collectively they were known as
the Bretton Woods System and were intended to prevent economic crisis and promote
capitalism.31 A principle concern during the Bretton Woods negotiations was the issue of free
floating currencies and their detrimental effects on trade.32 As a result, the participants agreed to

27

See id. (observing that the increase in broad money peaked in 1994, but decreased the
following year, and by 1997 the consumer price and retail price had significantly decreased
while maintaining 8.8% economic growth).
28
See id. (citing China’s use of monetary policy instruments during the Asian crisis to stimulate
domestic demand by increasing money supply, resulting in a 15.3 percent gain in money supply
in 1998 and 14.7 percent in 1999).
29

See supra note 23 (mentioning that China experienced 8% growth in 2002 and 9.1% growth in
2003 amidst the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak, defaulting loans,
inefficient state owned enterprises, and increased rural unemployment).
30

See JACKSON, supra note 2, § 5.4 (explaining that the Bretton Woods conference was held in
New Hampshire (1944), where the IMF and International Bank for Reconstruction (World Bank)
were created, but the GATT was completed later in 1948).
31

See Wilkipedia, Bretton Woods System (listing the goals of participating countries: to eliminate
economic policies that caused the Great Depression, prevent world war by promoting a liberal
economic system, and encourage international economic cooperation through free trade),
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bretton_Woods_Conference#.22Floating.22_Bretton_Woods_19681972 (last modified Nov. 8, 2004).
32

See Benjamin J. Cohen, Bretton Woods System (indicating that the floating exchange rates in
place during the 1930’s reduced trade because of currency fluctuations caused by speculation
6

adopt fixed exchange rates and accepted the role of the IMF as the global supervisor of monetary
policy.33 Ironically, it was not until 1971 that the United States discarded its fixed exchange rate
policy and floated the dollar.34 Thus, a goal of the Bretton Woods Conferences was to encourage
open markets and free trade, but stability was the main theme and resulted in the adoption of
fixed exchange rates by all members.35
1. IMF and GATT: Scope
A central purpose of the IMF is to monitor the exchange rate policies of member
countries.36 Article XV of GATT (1947) reiterates that the IMF is responsible for exchange rate
issues, while the GATT is responsible for trade related issues.37 The IMF and members of the

and government devaluation), at http://www.polsci.ucsb.edu/faculty/cohen/inpress/bretton.html
(last visited Oct. 20, 2004).
33

See id. (requiring that participating governments maintain fixed exchange rates within a range
of one percent, unless balance of payments imbalances required revaluation of the currency). The
IMF was given three functions – regulation of currency values, financial aid, and consultation.
Id.
34

See China’s Exchange Rate Policy Not Violate WTO, CHINA DAILY, Feb. 26, 2004 (quoting
U.S. Trade Rep., Robert Zoellick claiming that China’s pegged currency does not violate WTO
obligations and cites the fixed exchange rate employed by the United States until 1971 as
evidence that China’s currency policy complies with the WTO and GATT), at
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-02/26/content_309623.htm (last visited Nov.
10, 2004).

35

See supra note 31 (detailing the use of gold as the standard for pricing currencies to the
emergence of the dollar as the accepted standard used by countries to value their currencies), at
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/18902.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2004).
36

See Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, July 22, 1944, art. IV(3)(a)
(“The Fund shall oversee the international monetary system in order to ensure its effective
operation ... [T]he Fund shall exercise firm surveillance over the exchange rate policies of
members, and shall adopt specific principles for the guidance of all members with respect to
those policies ... the Fund shall pay due regard to the circumstances of members.”).
37

See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30 1947, art. XV(1), 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S.
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT](“The CONTRACTING PARTIES shall seek cooperation with the [IMF] to the end that the CONTRACTING PARTIES and the Fund may
7

GATT are encouraged to collaborate when currency issues affect trade or vice versa, but there is
no indication that the GATT has exclusive authority to address exchange rate policies of member
countries.38
A report by the GATT Balance of Payments Committee provides further guidance on the
topic of exchange rate measures when it stated “the [GATT] CONTRACTING PARTIES have
no authority over exchange restrictions.”39 Another working paper indicated that when a question
of overlapping jurisdiction arises, the GATT should only address trade issues.40 Although
exchange issues and trade issues are often hard to distinguish, the policy for resolving exchange
practices that have trade effects is for GATT members to consult with the IMF.41
B. GATT: Ad Article VI - Paragraph 2 & 3

pursue a coordinated policy with regard to exchange questions within the jurisdiction of the
Fund and questions of quantitative restrictions and other trade measures within the jurisdiction
of the CONTRACTING PARTIES”)(emphasis added).
38
See GATT art. XV(2) (“In all cases in which the CONTRACTING PARTIES are called upon
to consider or deal with problems concerning ... foreign exchange arrangements, they shall
consult fully with the [IMF].”)(emphasis added).
39

See GATT, Analytical Index: Guide to GATT Law and Practice, 6th ed. (1994), art.
XV(5)[hereinafter GATT Analytical Index] (noting that historically most GATT members used
exchange measures to regulate trade, and a country’s exchange rate system was rarely addressed
by the GATT Committee).
40

See GATT Working Paper, The Relationship between Trade Policy and the International
Financial System (1983) microformed on L/5572 p. 2, 3 para. 9-11 (Geo. Int. Law Library) (“The
most effective contribution the GATT could make to the resolution of trade and financial
problems would be the energetic pursuit of its normal activities – identification of trade
problems, efforts to define solutions and help in implementing them”).
41

See GATT Working Paper, Distinguishing between Trade and Exchange Measures (1960)
microformed on BOP/W/51 p. 4-5 ¶¶ 9-14 (Geo. Int. Law Library) (stating that sometimes it is
difficult or impossible to determine whether a governmental measure is “trade or financial in
character” but the jurisdiction of the IMF focuses on the technical aspect of the measure, whereas
the GATT emphasizes the effect of the measure on trade).
8

Generally, Article VI of GATT seeks to prevent dumping, which involves a country
artificially lowering the price of its exports below market prices of comparable products.42 Since
the practice of dumping is analogous to a subsidy, it will be covered in subsequent sections.43
This section will specifically analyze Ad Article VI, Paragraph 3 -- multiple currency practices.44
Multiple currency practices are government measures that involve applying a favorable currency
rate to exports in one category, but neglecting to apply the same currency rate to other exports in
order to promote the exportation of the preferred product.45 In some instances, if a country
receives approval from the IMF, it can operate a multiple currency practice, but it is obligated to
inform the GATT members if the multiple currency practice acts as a subsidy.46
C. WTO: SCM Agreement

42

See GATT art. VI(1) (“The contracting parties recognize that dumping, by which products of
one country are introduced into the commerce of another country at less than the normal value of
the products, is to be condemned if it causes or threatens material injury to an established
industry in the territory of a contracting party...”).
43

See discussion infra, Part II (analyzing China’s currency policy against Ad. Article VI
regarding Multiple Currency Practices and the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures).
44

See GATT Ad. Art. VI, ¶¶ 2-3 (“Multiple currency practices can in certain circumstances
constitute a subsidy to export which may be met with countervailing duties ... or can constitute a
form of dumping by means of a partial depreciation of a country’s currency which may be met
by action ... By ‘multiple currency practices’ is meant practices by governments or sanctioned by
governments.”).
45

See GATT Sub-Committee Meeting, Negotiations on Ad Art. VI para. 2 and 3 microformed on
E/PC/T/A/PV/20 p. 34-36 (Geo. Int. Law Library) (transcribing the negotiations surrounding Ad.
Article VI, Paragraph 3 and explaining that a multiple currency practice involves a government
applying a favorable exchange rate to a product they want to export, while applying less
advantageous exchange rates to other products).
46

See GATT Analytical Index, Article XVI (citing the Review Pursuant to Art. XVI:5, which
indicated that a member was obligated to notify other GATT members if their multiple currency
practice acted as a subsidy, regardless of whether the IMF approved of the practice).
9

The Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (“SCM Agreement”) Agreement provides
several elements that must be satisfied in order for a governmental measure to qualify as a
prohibited subsidy.47 In addition, Annex I of the SCM Agreement contains a list of practices,
which represent export subsidies and have been cited in the Petition48 as applicable to China’s
currency regime.49 Lastly, there are several provisions of the SCM Agreement that provide
exceptions for developing countries, existing programs, and countries moving toward market
economies that might be applicable to China.50
1. Elements of a Subsidy
The elements of a prohibited subsidy are: (1) a government contribution, (2) a benefit
conferred, and (3) specificity.51 First, there are several methods by which a government can
make a financial contribution under the SCM Agreement, including a direct transfer of funds,
government revenue foregone, government providing goods or services, or a government making
payment to a funding mechanism.52 Second, a benefit must be conferred from the financial
contribution.53 Third, a subsidy must be sufficiently specific in order to be prohibited.54

47

See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Legal Instruments—Results
of the Uruguay Round 31 I.L.M. 81 (1994)[hereinafter SCM Agreement](stating that the
elements of a prohibited subsidy are: a financial contribution from a government; a benefit
granted; and the subsidy must be specific to a particular industry)(emphasis added).
48

See supra note 3, at 66-69 (claiming that China’s currency policy violates item (b) and (j) of
Annex I of the SCM Agreement).
49

See generally SCM Agreement, Annex I (providing an illustrative list of export subsidies that
are both prohibited and specific).

50

See SCM Agreement art. 27-29 (outlining exceptions to prohibited subsidies for developing
country members, existing programs, and countries transforming to a market economy).
51

See supra note 47 (articulating the elements of a prohibited subsidy).

10

There is an important exception to the specificity requirement stated in paragraph 2.3 of
the SCM Agreement, which indicates a subsidy contingent on export performance is
automatically specific.55 A subsidy may be contingent in law56 on export performance or
contingent in fact on export performance.57 A subsidy contingent in fact is more difficult to
prove than a subsidy contingent in law because it cannot be observed from existing legislation.58

52

See SCM Agreement art. 1.1(a)(1) (providing that a direct transfer of funds might be grants,
loans, equity infusion, and loan guarantees; and government revenue forgone could be a tax
credit).

53

See WTO, Analytical Index: Guide to WTO Law and Practice, 1st ed. (2001), SCM Agreement
art. 1.1(b) [hereinafter WTO Analytical Index] (“[T]he ordinary meaning of benefit clearly
encompasses some form of advantage ... a financial contribution will only confer a benefit, i.e.,
an advantage, if it is provided on terms that are more advantageous than those that would have
been available to the recipient on the market), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_subjects_index_e.htm#bkmk2 (last visited
Nov. 1, 2004).

54

See SCM Agreement art. 2 (stating that a subsidy must be specific to an enterprise or industry
or group of enterprises or industries, and indicates a subsidy is not specific when objective
criteria determine eligibility so as not to differentiate between enterprises).
55

See id. art. 2-3 (“Any subsidy falling under the provisions of Article 3 shall be deemed to be
specific ... the following subsidies ... shall be prohibited: subsidies contingent, in law or in fact,
whether solely or as one of several other conditions, upon export performance, including those
illustrated in Annex I.”).
56

See WTO Analytical Index, SCM Agreement art. 3.1(a) para. 31 (“[A] subsidy is contingent
‘in law’ upon export performance when the existence of that condition can be demonstrated on
the basis of the very words of the relevant legislation, regulation or other legal instrument
constituting the measure ... such conditionality can also be derived by necessary implication from
the words actually used in the measure.”).
57

See SCM Agreement art. 3.1(a) n.4 (“This standard is met when the facts demonstrate that the
granting of a subsidy, without having been made legally contingent upon export performance, is
in fact tied to actual or anticipated exportation or export earnings. The mere fact that a subsidy is
granted to enterprises which export shall not for that reason alone be considered to be an export
subsidy within the meaning of this problem.”).
58

See WTO Analytical Index, SCM Agreement art. 3.1(a) para. 38 (“Proving de facto [in fact]
export contingency is a much more difficult task ... the existence of the relationship of
contingency, between the subsidy and export performance, must be inferred from the total
11

The Appellate Body has cited three elements that must be evaluated in order to determine
whether a subsidy is contingent in fact: (1) the granting of subsidy; (2) tied to or conditioned
upon; (3) actual or anticipated export earnings.59 If the aforementioned elements are satisfied
based on all relevant facts, then an export contingent in fact exists and the specificity
requirement is satisfied.60
2. SCM Agreement – Annex I
Annex I contains a list of practices that are prohibited subsidies under the SCM
Agreement, but only item (b) and (j) of Annex I were invoked by the Petition in their claim
against China.61 Item (b) involves currency retention schemes and item (j) addresses the
allocation of government export credit guarantee programs.62
3. SCM Agreement - Exceptions

configuration of the facts constituting and surrounding the granting of the subsidy, none of
which on its own is likely to be decisive in any given case.”) (emphasis added).
59
See WTO Analytical Index, SCM Agreement art. 3.1(a) ¶ 39 (stating that the “granting of a
subsidy” depends on whether the government provided a subsidy that was explicitly contingent
on export performance; that “tied to” requires demonstration of conditionality or dependence;
and “anticipated” should be understood as an expectation that exports will result from granting
subsidy).
60

See WTO Analytical Index, SCM Agreement art. 3.1(a) ¶ 41 (“Based on the explicit language
of Article 3.1(a) and footnote 4 of the SCM Agreement, in our view the determination of whether
a subsidy is ‘contingent ... in fact’ upon export performance requires us to examine all the facts
concerning the grant or maintenance of the challenged subsidy, including the nature of the
subsidy, its structure and operation, and the circumstances in which it was provided.”).
61

See supra note 48 (arguing that China’s currency policy is a prohibited subsidy because it
represents a currency retention scheme and a program to prevent exchange rate risk).
62

See SCM Agreement Annex I (defining item (b): “Currency retention schemes or any similar
practices which involve a bonus on exports”; and item (j): “The provision by governments (or
special institutions controlled by governments) of export credit guarantees or insurance
programs, of insurance or guarantee programs against increase in cost of exported products or of
exchange risk programs, at premium rates which are inadequate to cover the long-term operating
costs and losses of the programs.”).
12

There are three exceptions in the SCM Agreement that might be applicable to China.63
The first exception applies to developing country members and allows subsidies for a period of
time to encourage economic development.64 Second, the exception for existing programs permits
countries with preexisting subsidies to gradually eliminate them over time.65 The final exception
is for countries transforming from centrally planned to market economies.66 Each of the
exceptions provides a time frame for member countries to bring their subsidies into conformity
with the SCM Agreement.67 Considering China’s recent accession to the WTO, they might be
able to invoke one of these exceptions if needed.68
II. ANALYSIS
Bringing a claim to the WTO concerning China’s currency regime might pressure China
to some degree, but achieving a favorable decision from the Dispute Settlement Body (“DSB”) is

63

See supra note 50 (noting that allowance and extension of time limits on prohibited subsidies
are available for WTO members who qualify as developing countries, have existing subsidy
programs, or are making the transformation to a market economy).
64
See SCM Agreement art. 27.3 (stating that Art. 3 paragraph 1(a) shall not apply to developing
members for a period of eight years after entry into the WTO).
65

See SCM Agreement art. 28.1(b) (providing that members with existing programs shall not be
subject to Part II [Art. 3] of the SCM Agreement for a period of three years after entry into the
WTO).
66

See id. art. 29 (indicating an allowance for subsidies in countries transforming from a
government controlled economy to a free market economy and a period of seven years is
permitted to bring such subsidies into conformity with the SCM Agreement, unless more time is
needed for transformation).
67

See supra notes 64-66 (allowing developing countries eight years from entry into the WTO to
bring their subsidies into compliance, while existing programs are given three years, and
countries transforming into a market economy are provided seven years to comply with the SCM
Agreement).
68

See supra note 12 (noting that China’s accession to the WTO occurred on December 11, 2001).
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unlikely.69 The Petition, submitted by the China Currency Coalition,70 articulates several legal
arguments against China’s currency policy and will briefly be alluded to in each section.71
A. China’s Currency Regime and Multiple Currency Practices
The Petition stated that the Ad. Art. VI provision on multiple currency practices provided
evidence that the GATT contemplated and therefore prohibited currency policies that acted as
subsidies on exports.72 The Petition argued that since China’s currency regime benefited exports,
the provision on multiple currency practices provided a basis for connecting currency policy to a
trade violation.73 This argument does not stand up to scrutiny.
Although multiple currency practices can amount to a subsidy on exports, there is no
correlation between multiple currency practices and China’s overall exchange rate policy.74
Multiple currency practices are narrowly defined government measures that promote the export

69

See generally WTO Analytical Index, Dispute Settlement Understanding (outlining the
structure and scope of the dispute settlement body and providing the procedure for bringing a
claim including consultations and establishment of a panel), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/dsu_e.htm (last visited Nov. 1,
2004).
70
See supra note 3, at 4-5 (listing members of the China Currency Coalition, including the AFLCIO, American Iron and Steel Institute, American Textile Machinery Association (ATMA),
Associated Industries of Massachusetts, etc.).
71

See id. at 50-71 (articulating the argument that China’s currency regime violates: Ad Article VI
of GATT, the SCM Agreement, and item (b) and (j) from Annex I of SCM Agreement).

72

See id. at 54 (claiming that the inclusion of multiple currency practices as a possible violation
of GATT demonstrates that currency policies that benefit exports were also contemplated as
possible violations of GATT).
73

See id. at 54 (attempting to connect foreign exchange rate policies that benefit exports to
multiple exchange rate practices that act as subsidies on exports).
74

See supra note 45 (indicating that multiple currency practices involve the government practice
of applying favorable currency rates to certain products, while neglecting to apply those rates to
other products).
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of a certain product using preferential currency rates,75 whereas China’s currency regime is a
broad monetary policy that was adopted to stabilize the Chinese economy.76 In fact, China
abandoned dual exchange rates in 1994, in favor of a centrally controlled unified rate, and there
is no indication that China affords beneficial exchange rate treatment to specific products
designated for export.77 Consequently, China’s currency policy would not represent a multiple
currency practice.
A second issue is whether the provision on multiple currency practices contemplated a
situation like China’s where exchange rate policy benefits exports.78 Accepting such a nexus
would expand the meaning of multiple currency practices as intended by the framers of the
amendment.79 Just because a multiple currency practice is capable of being an export subsidy,
does not mean all currency practices are vulnerable to being export subsidies.80 Actually,

75

See id. (transcribing the negotiations of the committee that established Ad. Article VI, para. 23, note 2 and illustrating the meaning of multiple currency practices).

76

See supra note 26 (noting China’s implementation of a strict monetary policy in 1994 was to
curb inflation and sustain economic growth).
77
See Evolution of renminbi exchange rate regime, CHINA DAILY, Oct. 11, 2004 (noting that the
unification of China’s exchange rate occurred on Jan. 1, 1994, when the foreign exchange swap
market rate and official exchange rate were consolidated into one centrally controlled exchange
rate), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-10/11/content_381264.htm (last visited
Oct. 29, 2004).
78

See supra note 44 (“Multiple currency practices can in certain circumstances constitute a
subsidy to exports ... or can constitute a form of dumping ...”).
79

See supra note 45 (indicating that multiple currency practices are preferential currency rates
targeted at specific products that a government is desirous of exporting).

80

See supra note 38 (explaining that whenever a dispute arises between GATT members
concerning an exchange rate issue, the member should consult fully with the IMF and accept
their determinations on how to remedy the problem).
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multiple currency practices that operate as export subsidies are sometimes permissible with the
consent of the IMF.81
Therefore, China’s currency policy is not a multiple currency practice and the existence
of the provision does not make exchange rate policies as a whole susceptible to trade rules on
subsidies.82 Currency policy is an exchange measure, capable of having trade effects, but
nevertheless under IMF jurisdiction.83
B. Is China’s Fixed Exchange Rate a Subsidy?
The Petition asserted that China provided a prohibited subsidy by converting U.S. dollars
into yuan at an undervalued rate, thereby conferring a financial contribution to Chinese
exporters, whose products and labor are less expensive when compared to their American
competition.84 Furthermore, the Petition argued that China’s fixed exchange rate provided a
benefit to Chinese exporters because they would be unable to achieve the same price advantage
on the open market.85 Lastly, the Petition asserted that China’s currency policy satisfied the

81

See GATT ad. art. XVI sect. B(1) (“Nothing ... shall preclude the use by a contracting party of
multiple rates of exchange in accordance with the Articles of Agreement of the International
Monetary Fund.”).
82
See supra note 45.
83

See supra note 37 (stating that exchange rate issues are designated to the IMF and trade issues
are left to the GATT).
84

See Petition, at 58-61 (claiming that maintenance of the yuan at 8.28 to each dollar constitutes
a government service under Art. 1.1(a)(1)(iii) and provides a financial contribution to Chinese
exporters).
85

See id. at 61 (asserting that Chinese exports and businesses are benefited by a fixed exchange
rate, which maintains a cheap currency that would be markedly higher if exposed to market
forces).
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specificity requirement because it was contingent in fact on anticipated export performance.86
Again, a close examination of the SCM Agreement leads to a different conclusion.
1. Financial Contribution
The first element of a subsidy is a financial contribution.87 Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii) –
government dispensation of goods or services – was the only form of financial contribution cited
by the Petition and is the only provision that will be addressed in this section.88
The fact that China’s currency policy benefits exports does not signify that a financial
contribution – as defined by the SCM Agreement - was made by the Chinese Government to
exporters.89 The framers of the SCM Agreement wanted to avoid an effects approach that would
permit any government measure that benefited exports to be labeled a subsidy.90 Article

86

See id. at 62-66 (arguing that China’s currency policy is contingent in fact on export
performance because the fixed exchange rate is so closely linked to export performance).
87
See SCM Agreement, art. 1.1(a)(1) (outlining the four methods of financial contribution by a
government to be: (1) a direct transfer of funds, potential direct transfer of funds or liabilities; (2)
government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or not collected; (3) a government provides
goods or services other than general infrastructure, or purchases goods; and (4) a government
makes payments to a funding mechanism).
88

See Petition, at 60-61 (claiming that China’s artificial maintenance of an undervalued currency
and elimination of necessity for hedging mechanisms constitutes a governmental service under
Art. 1.1(a)(1)(iii)).
89

See United States – Measures Treating Export Restraints as Subsidies, WTO Dispute Panel
Report, WT/DS194/R ¶ 8.62 (Jun. 29, 2004) (“It does not follow ... that every government
intervention that might in economic theory be deemed a subsidy with the potential to distort
trade is a subsidy within the meaning of the SCM Agreement. Such an approach would mean
that the ‘financial contribution’ requirement would effectively be replaced by a requirement that
the government action in question be commonly understood to be a subsidy that distorts trade.”),
available at http://www.sice.oas.org/DISPUTE/wto/ds194/ds194re14.asp#downote162 (last
visited Nov. 3, 2004).
90

See id. at 8.68 (quoting Canada’s statements concerning the adoption of a financial
contribution test in determining whether a government measure is a subsidy and noting that
almost any government measure can have effects on trade and there need to be limits on
government activity that constitutes a subsidy).
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1.1(a)(1)(iii) indicates that the Chinese government would have to provide a financial
contribution in the form of goods or services to a private entity.91 China’s currency policy
benefits a wide range of exports in various sectors and is not limited to a specific enterprise.92
The benefit, however, does not derive from an explicit transfer of money, goods, or services
from the Chinese Government to private businesses in order to promote exports.93 To maintain
the fixed rate of exchange between the yuan and the dollar, the Chinese Central Bank must
purchase incoming dollars with yuan in order to control fluctuations.94 There is no transfer of
public assets to private exporters involved in the maintenance of a fixed exchange rate.95
Asserting that the operation of a fixed exchange rate is equivalent to the Chinese Government
providing a service to all Chinese exporters is an overly expansive application of the financial
contribution provision.96

91

See id. at 8.65 (“The negotiating history confirms that items (i)-(iii) [of Article 1.1(a)(1)] ...
limit these kinds of [government] measures to the transfer of economic resources from a
government to a private entity. Under subparagraphs (i)-(iii), the government acting on its own
behalf is effecting that transfer by directly providing something of value – either money, goods,
or services – to private entity.”) (emphasis added).
92

See supra note 23 (noting that China’s main exports include electric machinery and equipment,
power generation equipment, apparel, toys, and footwear).
93

See supra note 89, n. 155 (“Subsidies in international trade exist only when a financial charge
has been incurred by a government or administrative authority on behalf of a beneficiary ... Only
measures which constitute a charge on the public account or government budget ... constitute a
subsidy ... Countervailing action ... [should] be made conditional upon a governmental practice
which involves a net transfer of funds from public sources to the recipient.”).
94

See Reem Heakal, Floating and Fixed Exchange Rates, Investopedia.com (Feb. 6, 2003)
(explaining the process of central bank intervention to maintain a pegged exchange rate and the
need to buy and sell foreign currency to prevent currency fluctuations), at
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/03/020603.asp. (last visited Nov. 5, 2004).
95

See id. (noting that the currency used to maintain a fixed exchange rate is bought and sold on
foreign exchange markets).
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2. Benefit
The second element of a subsidy is a benefit conferred.97 China’s maintenance of a fixed
exchange rate produces a beneficial effect on Chinese exports, which are less expensive than
comparative products produced in the United States.98 Unlike the financial contribution element
of a subsidy, which focuses on the government activity, the benefit element switches the
attention to the recipient.99 Conferring a benefit requires that the recipient be put in a better
position than would have been available in the open market.100

96

See United States – Measures Treating Export Restraints as Subsidies, WTO Dispute
Settlement Reports, WT/DS194/R ¶ 8.34-34 (Jun. 29, 2001) (“We consider that it cannot be the
case that the nature of a Member government’s measure under the SCM Agreement is to be
determined solely on the basis of the reaction to that measure by those it affects. Rather, the
existence of a financial contribution by a government must be proven by reference to the action
of the government.... [W]e do not see how the reaction of private entities to a given
governmental measure can be the basis on which the Member’s compliance with its treaty
obligations under the WTO is established.... [A]pplying the ‘effects’ approach to the question of
whether a financial contribution exists would have far-reaching implications. In particular, it
would seem to imply that any government measure that creates market conditions favorable to or
resulting in the increased supply [or demand] of a product in the domestic [or foreign] market
would constitute a government-entrusted or government-directed provision of goods, and hence a
financial contribution”).
97

See supra note 53 (describing the characteristics of a benefit as defined under Article 1 of the
SCM Agreement).
98

See Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Yee Wong, International Economics Policy Briefs: China
Bashing 2004, Institute for International Economics (Sep. 2004) (noting that Goldman Sachs
estimates China’s currency to be undervalued by 10 to 15 percent, but Goldstein and Lardy at the
Institute for International Economics estimates the yuan to be undervalued by 15 to 25 percent),
at http://www.iie.com/publications/pb/pb04.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2004).
99

See WTO Analytical Index art. 1.1(b) ¶ 17 (“[W]e believe that Canada’s argument that ‘cost to
government’ is one way of conceiving of ‘benefit’ is at odds with the ordinary meaning of
Article 1.1(b), which focuses on the recipient and not on the government providing the ‘financial
contribution’.”).
100

See WTO Analytical Index art. 1.1(b) ¶ 18 (stating that the word “benefit” implies a
comparison and a benefit may only be conferred if the recipient is placed in a better position than
he would have been able to attain in the open market).
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Since each U.S. dollar is equal to 8.28 Chinese yuan, U.S. consumers can purchase
Chinese products for less than comparable products produced in the United States.101 Chinese
exporters, therefore, have a cost advantage over U.S. producers, which is partially due to China’s
exchange rate policy.102 The resulting cost advantage constitutes a benefit as defined by Article
1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement because Chinese exporters would be unable to achieve the same
advantage on the open market.103
3. Specificity
The subsidy must be specific to be prohibited.104 China’s exchange rate policy is not
specific to a particular industry or enterprise; it applies to the entire economy.105 Since China’s
currency regime is not specific, it must qualify as a subsidy contingent on export performance to
meet the specificity requirement.106 The Petition conceded that there is no legislation explicitly

101

See Morris Goldstein, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Domestic and International
Monetary Policy, Trade, Technology Committee on Financial Services (Oct. 1, 2003) (stating
that the exchange rate between the dollar and the yuan has a direct impact on the U.S. trade
deficit), available at http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/goldstein1003.htm (last visited Oct.
12, 2004).
102

See Hufbauer supra note 98 (indicating Chinese manufacturing wages are 88 cents per hour,
while comparable U.S. manufacturing wages are around 9 dollars per hour).

103

See id. (estimating the undervaluation of China’s currency to be between 10 and 40 percent,
and indicating that the pegging of the yuan to the dollar has benefited Chinese exports).

104

See supra notes 54-55 (explaining that a subsidy must be specific to a particular industry or
enterprise in order to be prohibited, unless the subsidy is contingent in law or in fact on export
performance, in which case it is automatically specific).
105

See Hufbauer, supra note 98 (“An undervalued exchange rate is probably the least specific of
any benefit that a government might confer ... WTO case law in other subsidy disputes runs
strongly against the proposition that an undervalued exchange rate qualifies as a specific
benefit.”).

106

See supra note 55 (outlining the process of satisfying the specificity requirement of a
prohibited subsidy through Article 2.3 of the SCM Agreement).
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stating that China’s currency policy is contingent on export performance. Thus, a subsidy
contingent in law on export performance is ruled out and only a subsidy contingent in fact could
possibly apply to China’s currency policy.
a. Subsidy Contingent in Fact on Export Performance
China fails to meet the requirements of a subsidy contingent in fact on export
performance because its currency policy is conditioned on economic stability, not exports.107
i. Condition on Granting the Subsidy
The first step is to determine whether there is a condition of export performance on
China’s maintenance of a fixed currency regime.108 Unlike a subsidy contingent in law,109 the
evaluation of a subsidy contingent in fact requires that all facts and circumstances surrounding
the subsidy be taken into consideration.110 Since China’s monetary policy fails to meet the
financial contribution requirement of Article 1, it is difficult to argue that a subsidy was
granted.111

107

See supra note 26 (noting the purpose of China’s strict monetary controls were to control
inflation without eliminating economic growth).
108

See supra notes 59-60 (indicating that the first step in determining the existence of a subsidy
contingent in fact on export performance is whether the granting authority imposed a condition
of export performance when providing the subsidy, and emphasizing that all relevant facts
surrounding the maintenance the subsidy should be considered).
109

See supra note 52 (explaining that subsidies contingent in law on export performance can be
observed or implied from the text of legislation).

110

See supra note 60 (indicating that a subsidy contingent in fact requires an objective
assessment of all facts surrounding the grant or maintenance of the subsidy).
111

See supra notes 89-90 (demonstrating that a subsidy requires a financial contribution, which
entails the government incurring a charge for the benefit of a private beneficiary).
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Nevertheless, China adopted a fixed exchange rate in 1994112 to curb inflation that had
resulted from rapid economic expansion during the 1980’s.113 In the late 1990’s, when most
Asian currencies were rapidly depreciating, China maintained its exchange rate while using other
monetary policies to increase money supply and encourage domestic spending.114 Currently,
China is reforming its banking and financial sectors and is gradually making the transformation
to a market economy.115
Ensuring economic stability is a principle concern of the Chinese Government as they
attempt to cool their economy and avoid inflation.116 With a multitude of economic
considerations, any averment that the Chinese Government imposed a condition of export
performance by pegging the yuan against the dollar excludes other important factors.117

112

See Gen-you supra note 26 (indicating that although China’s economy grew at an average rate
of 12 percent between 1991 and 1995, there were concurrent increases in annual inflation rates
from 12.9 percent to 24.1 percent in 1994).
113

See supra notes 24-25 (attributing the economic expansion that occurred during the 1980’s to
the liberal reforms that were implemented in 1979).
114
See id. (summarizing China’s repeated lowering of interest rates, expansion of open market
operations, and increase of commercial banks credit scope to increase money supply and
promote domestic spending during the Asian financial crisis).
115

See supra note 19 (highlighting the goals of China’s Premier, Wen Jiabao, to push forward
with market oriented reforms including: privatization of state run banks, improving asset
management institutions handling of bad loans, opening the capital and financial services market,
and reducing overcapacity from investment in saturated industries).
116

See James Cox, Amid fears of inflation, Beijing ups lending rate, USA TODAY.COM, Oct. 28,
2004 (commenting on China’s decision to raise interest rates in order to slow economic growth
and concluding that a de-acceleration of the Chinese economy would have significant global
effects), at http://www.usatoday.com/money/world/2004-10-28-china-rates_x.htm (last visited
Nov. 14, 2004).

117

See supra note 18 (concluding that China should be hesitant to modify its exchange rate policy
when its banking a financial sectors are underdeveloped).
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Although a goal of China’s monetary policy may be to encourage exports along with
other market oriented practices; monetary policy represents a broader initiative than a narrow
relationship of conditionality between China’s exchange rate policy and export performance.118
ii. Contingent on Export Performance
The second step is whether the granting of the subsidy was tied to or dependent upon
anticipated export performance.119 Based on numerous instances of inflation, near financial
disaster during the late 1990’s, and ongoing transformation to a market economy; China’s
continued maintenance of a fixed exchange rate appears to be tied to preventing disasters and
promoting economic stability.120 Given the interdependent nature of the global economy, China’s
market is a vital cog in the global economic wheel.121 Thus, to claim that China’s exchange rate
is dependent upon export performance excludes other economic factors essential to overall
stability.122

118

See supra notes 23-25 (providing a history of China’s attempts to implement market oriented
policies including privatization of state run enterprises, acceptance of foreign investment, and
accession to the WTO).
119
See GATT Analytical Index art. 3.1(a) ¶ 39 (“[T]he facts must ‘demonstrate’ that the granting
of a subsidy is tied to or contingent upon actual or anticipated exports. It does not suffice to
demonstrate solely that a government granting a subsidy anticipated that exports would result.
The prohibition ... applies to subsidies that are contingent upon export performance.”).
120

See Gen-you supra note 26 (“The objective of China’s monetary policy is to maintain the
stability of the currency value to advance economic growth.... The monetary policy to be pursued
in the next five years should be designed to ward off deflation and inflation as well. This should
be our cardinal principle”).

121

See Hufbauer supra note 98 (noting that China surpassed Japan as the world’s third largest
importer; Chinese importation of oil is second in the world and China’s nickel imports will be
number one in the world by the end of 2004).
122

See supra note 14, (noting China’s desire to revalue its currency but concerns over bad debt,
banking and financial sector reforms, and inflation were preventing definitive action).
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Arguably, since exports represent a fundamental component of China’s economy, they
might be necessary to economic stability. However, there are other aspects of the Chinese
economy, like FDI, that could draw the same comparison.123 China’s economic stability is
dependent on FDI because it contributes to the displacement of inefficient state-run enterprises
with modern privately managed businesses, thereby reducing bad debt and improving
productivity.124 Providing a stable currency encourages foreign investment because it prevents
large currency fluctuations, which deter foreign businesses from investing.125 Therefore, China’s
economic stability can be attributed to various factors including exports, but export performance
is not the sole objective of their currency policy.126
iii. Expected or Anticipated Export Performance

123

See Hufbauer, supra note 98 (indicating that China’s accumulation of foreign exchange
reserves is due in large part to foreign direct investment amounting to $53 billion in 2003, which
is the highest FDI in the world and exceeded China’s trade surplus of $45.9 billion in 2003).

124

See generally Country Briefings: China, ECONOMIST.COM, Jan. 9, 2004 (noting that reform of
poorly performing state-run enterprises, improvement of income disparities between rural and
industrial workers, and reduction of bad debt are essential goals of Chinese economic policy), at
http://www.economist.com/countries/China/profile.cfm?folder=Profile-FactSheet (last visited
Nov. 15, 2004).
125

See THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, Introduction, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE at xi-xv (Anchor
Books 2000) (detailing the chain of events that caused the Asian financial crisis and illustrating
the nexus between investor risk aversion, exchange rate instability, and economic catastrophes).
126

See People’s Bank of China, Macro-control Policies Proved Effective, and Financial Industry
Performance Remained Healthy and Stable, (July 23, 2004) (noting the progress of various
objectives of China’s central bank during the first half of 2004: the faster than desired expansion
of loans were brought under control, deposits increased steadily, and RMB [yuan] exchange rate
remained stable; overall control of aggregate money and credit contributed to the healthy and
stable performance of the financial industry),
http://www.pbc.gov.cn/english/detail.asp?col=6620&ID=3 (last visited Nov. 2, 2004).
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The third element focuses on whether exports were anticipated when the subsidy was
granted.127 As previously mentioned, China implemented strict monetary controls including a
fixed exchange rate with the expectation of stabilizing its economy.128 In Canada – Aircraft,
“projected export sales anticipated to flow directly from [the subsidy]...”129 demonstrated the
necessary expectation of export performance. Unlike Canada – Aircraft, China’s maintenance of
a fixed exchange rate entails macroeconomic projections or expectations, not industry specific
export projections.130 While China may expect increased exports from their monetary policy; that
alone is insufficient because their exchange rate policy is tied to overall economic stability, not
export performance.131 Therefore, China’s expectation of increased exports from their
maintenance of a pegged exchange rate is meaningless without a clear demonstration of
conditionality between the exchange rate policy and exports.132
b. Annex I: item (b) and (j)

127

See WTO Analytical Index art. 3.1(a) ¶ 40 (noting that anticipation of export performance
entails an expectation that exports will flow from the granting of the subsidy).
128

See supra note 26 (indicating that controlling inflation was a primary concern of the Chinese
Government during the 1990’s).
129

See id. (illustrating the level of factual evidence needed to prove an expectation of export
performance).
130
See Gen-you supra note 26 (“[In China’s] Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social
Development and the Long-Range Objectives to the Year 2010, the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of China specified in 1995 that curbing inflation was the primary task for
macro-economic adjustment ... and stressed the importance of pursuing a moderately tight fiscal
and monetary policies”).
131

See supra note 59 (“A subsidy may well be granted in the knowledge, or with the anticipation,
that exports will result. Yet, that alone is not sufficient, because that alone is not proof that the
granting of the subsidy is tied to the anticipation of exportation.”).
132

See supra note 96 ¶ 8.42 (“In other words, the Appellate Body found that a cause and effect
relationship between the subsidy and actual or anticipated trends in exports was not sufficient to
satisfy the ‘tied to’ standard of conditionality for export contingency to exist.”).
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The final way of meeting the requirement of specificity is through Annex I -- illustrative
list of activities that constitute subsidies.133
Item (b) addresses currency retention schemes, which permit certain exporters to retain a
portion of receipts from foreign exchange earnings notwithstanding a general rule for businesses
to surrender receipts of foreign exchange to the central bank in exchange for local currency.134 A
currency retention scheme is wholly unrelated to China’s exchange rate policy because it
involves the Chinese Government’s allowance of exporters to retain foreign exchange when they
would normally be obligated to convert the currency to yuan.135 Thus, China’s maintenance of a
pegged exchange rate is not sufficiently analogous to a currency retention scheme, and therefore
fails to represent a subsidy.136
Item (j) addresses government credit programs that ensure exports against exchange rate
risk.137 Since the yuan is fixed at 8.28 to each dollar, there is no need for Chinese or U.S.
businesses to spend money on hedging exchange rates.138 The Chinese Government’s

133

See supra note 49 (referring to Annex I – Illustrative List of Export Subsidies).

134

See Deborah E. Siegel, Legal Aspects of the IMF/WTO Relationship: The Fund’s Articles of
Agreement and the WTO Agreements, 96 Am. J. Int’l L. 561, 596 (Jul. 2002) (defining currency
retention schemes).
135
See Petition at 67 n. 73 (citing China’s rules and regulations concerning export collection of
foreign exchange).
136

See SCM Agreement article 3.1(a) (indicating that subsidies listed under Annex I are
prohibited and automatically specific).
137

See supra notes 61-62 (defining government credit programs that protect against the increase
in cost of exchange risk programs at rates which are inadequate to cover the long-term operating
costs and losses of the programs).
138

See Ian H. Giddy, The Corporate Hedging Process (“Financial risks - regardless of whether or
not they are managed - exist in every business. The manager who opts not to hedge is betting that
the markets will either remain static or move in his favor. For example, a U.S. computer
manufacturer with French franc receivables that decides to not hedge its exposure to the French
26

maintenance of a fixed exchange rate provides an indirect benefit by eliminating the need for
hedging, but item (j) makes reference to the cost of the program when describing the government
provision.139
The Chinese Government does not transfer funds or forego revenue in order to eliminate
exchange rate risk.140 Although a benefit is conferred to Chinese exporters by not having to
hedge against currency fluctuations, the Chinese Government suffers no financial detriment to
provide the program.141 China’s currency policy is distinguishable from item (j) because it does
not impose a financial cost on the Chinese Government to eliminate exchange rate risk.142
c. China’s Currency Policy is Probably Not a Prohibited Subsidy
The macroeconomic nature of China’s exchange rate policy does not satisfy the SCM
Agreement’s requirements of a prohibited subsidy.143 The Petition attempts to stuff a broad

franc is speculating that the value of the French franc relative to the U.S. dollar will either
remain stable or appreciate. In the process, the manufacturer is leaving itself exposed to the risk
that the French franc will depreciate relative to the U.S. dollar and hurt the company's
revenues.”) (emphasis added), at http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~igiddy/corphdg.htm (last visited
Nov. 1, 2004).
139

See supra note 48 (“The provision by governments of export credit guarantee or insurance
programs ... at premium rates which are inadequate to cover the long- term operating costsand
losses of the programs.”) (emphasis added).
140
See People’s Bank of China, Monetary Instruments(stating that the People’s Bank of China
uses monetary policy instruments such as: reserve requirement ratio, central bank base interest
rate, rediscounting, central bank lending, open market operation and other policy instruments
specified by the State Council), at http://www.pbc.gov.cn/english/huobizhengce/instruments.asp
(last visited Nov. 1, 2004).
141

See supra note 89-91 (indicating that a subsidy requires a transfer of assets whether it be direct
payment or forbearance of payment from the government to a private entity).

142

See supra note 126 (indicating that the policies used by the Bank are macroeconomic in nature
and have broad economic effects).
143

See id. (“Macro financial control polices have since proved quite effective as growth of money
supply declined ... RMB exchange rate remained stable.... control of aggregate money and credit
has contributed to the healthy and stable performance of the financial industry.”).
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monetary policy into the narrowly defined financial contribution and specificity elements of a
subsidy.144 China’s exchange rate policy is not a subsidy because there is no transfer of assets
from the government to private exporters and it is contingent on overall economic stability, not
exports.145
C. Exceptions
If China’s currency regime was held to be a prohibited subsidy, there are exceptions in
the SCM Agreement which would either permit China to continue its currency peg or provide
time to modify their exchange rate policy.146
1. Article 27: Developing Country Members
The SCM Agreement recognizes that developing countries might need the assistance of
certain subsidies in furthering the goals of development and economic growth.147 China is a
developing country148 and is actively attempting to raise standards of living through economic

144

See Petition at 58-69 (articulating the argument that China’s Government provides an indirect
subsidy to exports by sustaining the undervalued rate of exchange between the yuan and the
dollar).
145

See People’s Bank of China, Objective of the Monetary Policy (“The objective of monetary
policy is to maintain the stability of the Renminbi and thereby promote economic growth.”), at
http://www.pbc.gov.cn/english/huobizhengce/objective.asp (last visited Nov. 1, 2004).
146

See supra notes 63-67 (noting that the SCM Agreement includes exceptions for developing
countries, existing programs, and countries transforming to market economies).

147

See SCM Agreement art. 27 (stating that developing countries sometimes need subsidies to
encourage economic growth and that subsidies operated by developing countries are not subject
to prohibition under Article 3.1(a)).

148

See The World Bank Group, Data and Statistics: Country Groups (2004) (classifying China as
a developing country in the East Asia and Pacific region and indicating a per capita GNI below
1000 dollars for 2001 and 2002), at
http://www.worldbank.org/data/countryclass/classgroups.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2004).
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reform.149 Developing countries are granted eight years from entry into the WTO to bring their
subsidies into conformity.150 Since China acceded to the WTO on December 11, 2001 they
would qualify for an exception under Article 27 and would have over five years to modify their
exchange rate regime.151 Furthermore, China might be able to extend their exchange rate policy
past the eight years if maintenance of the exchange rate is deemed necessary by the
Committee.152
2. Article 28: Existing Programs
The second exception applies to subsidies that are already in place at the time of
accession.153 China implemented its pegged currency policy in 1994, well before 2001, and has
remained in place since then.154 Consequently, China would not be subject to the rules regarding
prohibited subsidies until three years after the date of its accession into the WTO.
3. Article 29: Transformation To a Market Economy

149

See supra note 124 (indicating that unemployment is approximately 9 percent in China and a
principle aim of the Chinese government is to reduce the income disparities between urban and
rural areas through economic reform).
150

See SCM Agreement art. 27 (“The prohibition of paragraph 1(a) shall not apply to ...
developing country Members for a period of eight years, from the date of entry into force of the
WTO Agreement...”).
151
See supra note 12 (stating that China became a member of the WTO on December 11, 2001
after 15 years of negotiations.).
152

See supra note 150 (“If a developing country Member deems it necessary to apply such
subsidies beyond the eight-year period, it shall not later than one year before the expiry of this
period enter into consultations with the Committee, which will determine whether an extension
of this period is justified, after examining all the relevant economic financial and development
needs of the developing country Member in question.”).

153

See SCM Agreement art. 28 (noting that prohibited subsidy programs established before
accession to the WTO shall be brought into conformity with the SCM Agreement within three
years, but until then such programs are not prohibited).

154

See supra note 1 (revealing that China pegged its currency against the dollar on January 3,
1994).
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The last exception applicable to China is for countries moving toward a market
economy.155 Beginning in 1979, China has gradually changed from a state controlled economy to
a market economy.156 Continued efforts include China’s accession into the WTO, privatization of
state operated enterprises, and allowance of FDI.157 China has stumbled, however, in fully
implementing their WTO obligations and in reforming their banking industry.158 Nevertheless,
China has made significant progress while adjusting to the expected difficulties that accompany
radical economic change.159 Therefore, China would likely qualify as a country transforming to a
market economy and be granted seven years from the date of their accession into the WTO to
bring their currency practice into compliance.160
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See SCM Agreement art. 29 (stating that countries moving from centrally planned economies
to market oriented economies are permitted to use programs and measures necessary for that
transformation).
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See Country Briefings: China - Economic Structure, ECONOMIST.COM (Feb. 9, 2004) (“Until
1978 output was dominated by large state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Since then much of the
boom in manufacturing output has been produced by ... private entrepreneurs or foreign
investors, either in wholly owned enterprises or in joint ventures with Chinese interests. By 2002
the share of state-owned and state-holding enterprises in gross industrial output value had shrunk
to 41%. However, state-owned companies, controlled by economic ministries in Beijing, taken in
isolation represented only 16% of industrial output.”), at
http://www.economist.com/countries/China/profile.cfm?folder=Profile%2DEconomic%20Struct
ure (last visited Nov. 3, 2004).
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See supra note 115 (outlining the market reforms sought by the Chinese government).
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See supra note 12 (providing the areas where China has failed to comply with their WTO
commitments).

159

See generally Report on the Development of China’s Market Economy 2003, China.org.cn
(Nov. 2003) (detailing the market oriented reforms China has made across a wide spectrum of
economic sectors including labor, capital, land, trade, and intermediary organizations), at
http://www.china.org.cn/english/2003chinamarket/79411.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2004).
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See SCM Agreement art. 29 (“For such members, subsidy programs falling within the scope
of Article 3 ... shall be phased out or brought into conformity with Article 3 within a period of
seven years from the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement”).
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4. Summary
The likelihood of China’s currency policy meeting the requirements of a subsidy is
remote.161 Even if their currency regime was determined to be a prohibited subsidy, China could
avoid reprimand by citing one of the three exceptions. The developing country or transformation
to market economy provisions seems preferable since they provide more time to eliminate
prohibited practices.162
III. RECOMMENDATIONS
The United States has appropriately adopted a diplomatic approach to encourage China to
revalue or float their currency.163 Judging by the almost immediate dismissal of the Petition, the
U.S. Government will not be initiating any legal action at the WTO.164 Although diplomacy has
not yet produced the desired result, there are additional initiatives the United States could pursue
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See supra note 98 (mentioning that a complaint concerning China’s currency regime would
likely fail if it were submitted to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body because it fails to meet the
financial contribution and specificity aspects of the SCM Agreement).
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See supra notes 63-67 (indicating that developing countries are given eight years or more to
bring their subsidies into conformity and transforming economies are granted seven years to
comply with the WTO).
163

See Office of United States Trade Rep., Dept. of Treasury Efforts Yielding Results on China
Currency (Sept. 9, 2004) (quoting Treasury Secretary John Snow: “With steady progress clearly
being made, the most effective way at this time to achieve the goal of a flexible, market-based
exchange rate in China is to maintain the persistent engagement we have established rather than
through a trade petition. Economic isolationism does not work and it’s a path we will not
follow.”), at
http://www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/Fact_Sheets/2004/Dept_of_Treasury_Efforts_Yielding_
Results_on_China_Currency.html.
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See Evelyn Iritani, U.S. Rejects Petition to Punish China on Currency: Labor, textile and steel
groups alleged that manipulation led to unfair trade advantages, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2004, at
C1 (explaining that the Bush Administration dismissed the Section 301 Petition within hours of
its filing and called it a “reckless act of economic isolationism”).
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to either increase the likelihood of China altering its currency policy or reduce the bilateral trade
deficit with China.165
A. Learning from History
Several countries have made the transformation from a fixed exchange rate to modified
floating or full floating exchange rates.166 Inherent in any government’s decision to float are the
possible risks associated with market based exchange rate.167 Most countries that have adopted
floating exchange rate regimes have done so because of a crisis or voluntarily, but not from
coercion.168
Chile provides and example of a country that adopted a floating exchange rate, but first
implemented supervisory mechanisms to protect against instability.169 India also switched to a
floating exchange rate, but decided to add supervisory mechanisms after the policy change
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See supra note 163 (listing capital account liberalization, banking sector reform, financial
product development, financial services opening, and current account reform as the areas of
China’s financial sector that need further reform in order to accommodate a more liberal
currency regime).
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See Dalia Hakura, Learning To Float: The Experience of Emerging Market Countries Since
the Early 1990’s, IMF: World Economic Outlook 2004 (2004) (reviewing India, Chile, and
Brazil’s transformation from fixed exchange rates to floating exchange rate regimes), available
at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2004/02/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2004).
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See id. at 89 (explaining the apprehension that many developing countries exhibit regarding
the adoption of a floating exchange rate, which is derived from the possibility of exchange rate
volatility).
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See id. at 90-91 (defining a crisis to include depreciation of the currency against the dollar of
20 percent or a doubling of depreciation of the currency from the previous year).
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See id. at 92 (noting that before implementing the floating exchange rate policy Chile had
strengthened its banking supervision by passing laws which gave regulators the necessary tools
to control exchange rate volatility).
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instead of before.170 Since the stabilizing mechanisms were not fully implemented, India’s
central bank was forced to intervene occasionally to maintain the stability of its currency.171
Like Chile, the United States could assist China in establishing the financial supervisory
mechanisms that are necessary to ensure stability when implementing a liberal currency
policy.172 An obvious opportunity exists in China’s banking sector reforms.173 China is gradually
allowing privately owned foreign banks to establish themselves and derivative markets are
slowly being developed, which should reduce the issuance of bad loans and create essential
hedging mechanisms.174 U.S. financial institutions could play a pivotal role in the elimination of
critical weaknesses in China’s financial sector.175
In addition, the United States could urge the IMF to be more active in China’s monetary
reforms.176 China is a member of the IMF and utilizing their expertise might produce a more
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See id. (stating that an efficient well managed banking sector is essential to maintaining
stability after removing controls on capital flows, interest rates, and exchange rates).
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Exchange, Chicago Mercantile Exchange, and Automobile financing through Ford Motor Co.).
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efficient transition toward a floating currency regime.177 If China is reluctant to accept
assistance, the United States might pressure the IMF to be more vocal concerning China’s need
to modify its exchange rate.178 The faster China can effectively adopt the requisite supervisory
mechanisms to prevent instability associated with a floating exchange rate, the more likely it is
that a policy change will occur.179
B. Other Methods of Solving the Problem
There is a possibility that China will not modify their exchange rate policy.180 Based on
that assumption, the United States should increase pressure on China to comply with its WTO
obligations.181 Although China has made progress in opening its market to foreign competition,
there are numerous areas of their economy that violate the WTO.182 If China were to comply
with all of their WTO commitments, the United States would gain greater access to Chinese
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dissatisfied with China’s currency policy).
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See supra note 14 (noting that China intends to modify its exchange rate policy, but not until
inflationary pressures are quelled and banking reforms have taken shape).
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See supra note 116 (noting that some economists view China’s recent interest rate hike as a
clear sign that a change in exchange rate policy is not going occur in the near future).
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treatment to domestic products through value added taxes (VAT)).
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markets that are currently protected, which would likely increase exports to China and reduce the
trade deficit.183
Another aspect of China’s economy that would decrease the current trade imbalance is a
relaxation of constraints on capital flows.184 Chinese exporters receive large amounts of
incoming dollars that are converted into yuan, but Chinese businesses have only recently been
able to invest that money or capital abroad.185 If capital flows were completely unrestrained, then
Chinese businesses would be free to invest in the U.S. economy, thereby alleviating upward
pressure on the yuan and reducing the trade deficit.186
Furthermore, the United States risks creating a confrontational atmosphere if a legal
course of action is pursued against China.187 Conversely, a diplomatic approach might enhance
our relationship with China and actually yield a favorable result faster than a drawn out decision
before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body.188
IV. CONCLUSION
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Countries have a great deal of freedom in selecting a currency regime and are only
restricted by their willingness to accept advice from institutions like the IMF.189 Even though
China’s peg against the dollar has adverse effects on the bilateral trade deficit and U.S.
manufacturing jobs, it fails to represent a prohibited subsidy as defined by the SCM
Agreement.190
By imposing narrow limitations on government activities that are considered subsidies,
the SCM Agreement has excluded broad monetary policy from qualifying as a subsidy.191
China’s monetary policy fails to meet the element of a financial contribution by the government
because there was no transfer of assets or services from a public account to a private entity.192 In
addition, China’s currency policy is not contingent in fact on export performance because the
circumstances reveal that their exchange rate policy is tied to stability, not export
performance.193 It was also evident that multiple currency practices, currency retention schemes,
and credit programs were separate concepts and unrelated to macroeconomic currency policy.194
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Therefore, to effectively address the problems that stem from China’s exchange rate
regime, the United States should continue diplomatic negotiations, but increase pressure on
China for WTO compliance and provide assistance with financial reforms necessary for market
driven exchange rates.195 A complaint to the WTO regarding China’s currency policy would be
misplaced because the IMF is responsible for exchange measures and is better suited to address
the issue.196
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See discussion infra Part III (arguing that increased pressure on China to continue financial
sector reforms and full compliance with WTO obligations would alleviate the bilateral trade
imbalance and contribute to China’s likelihood of adopting a liberal exchange rate policy).
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